Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

578 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
In July in Paris, Clausen interviewed Bratton. He showed
Bratton ten affi davits he had collected bearing on the “Winds
Code” message and delivery of the 13 parts of the Japanese reply to
our ultimatum—the fi ve already mentioned (Dusenbury, Gailey,
Bedell Smith, Gerow, and Deane) and fi ve others by Army offi cers
who said they couldn’t recall details of pre-attack events. Th ese
affi davits did not really diff er from Bratton’s APHB testimony,
for most of the offi cers didn’t answer Clausen’s questions directly.
Only Dusenbury’s affi davit actually confl icted with Bratton’s previous
statements, and when Dusenbury erred, Bratton pointed
that out.
Clausen usually typed the affi davits, sometimes retyping
them when an interviewee requested changes. At the Joint
Congressional Committee Bratton recalled: “[I] dictated what I
thought I should say,” making corrections as we went along.
Finally we got it all in shape in pencil. Th en he [Clausen] put
a piece of paper into the typewriter and typed the affi davit.
Bratton made some further suggestions and corrections; only
after Bratton was satisfi ed that the affi davit represented his
“best recollection” did he sign it. 40
Th e Japanese reply to our ultimatum, Bratton said in his affi -
davit, started coming in from the Navy the evening of December
6. He and Dusenbury were on duty together. Bratton’s account
diff ered from Dusenbury’s. After receipt of the 13th part, Bratton
determined from SIS that the 14th part was not likely to come in
that night. Bratton and Dusenbury then assembled the 13 parts
in preparation for delivery to the authorized recipients. Bratton
directed Colonel Dusenbury to deliver the set for the Chief
of Staff [Marshall] to his home at Fort Myer that night as
Colonel Dusenbury went to his home in Arlington. Th is was
about 10:00 p.m.
40 Ibid., part 10, p. 4616. Bratton before the Joint Committee.