Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 577
In his role as secretary to the chief of staff , Bedell Smith had
several assistant secretaries. One of them must have been on duty
that night. But Clausen interviewed only one, John R. Deane,
who had not been on duty that night. 38
Gerow had been chief of army war plans in 1941. When
Clausen secured Gerow’s affi davit, at Cannes, France, Gerow was
both positive and direct. During November and December 1941
he had received and reviewed the MAGIC intercepts in their
raw, unevaluated form, and had always returned them promptly
to G-2. He recalled seeing the requests from Tokyo for reports
on ship movements at Pearl Harbor, but as “these related especially
to Navy, I assumed that the Navy was fully cognizant, and
would interpret this information.” However, Gerow did not consider
Pearl Harbor to be Japan’s only interest; he recalled similar
inquiries made of Japanese consuls at Manila and Seattle.
Gerow did not remember conversations with either Bratton
on December 4 or Sadtler on December 5 concerning alarming
Japanese intercepts, at which time Gerow had replied that “suffi -
cient” warnings had already been sent to the overseas commanders.
In his opinion, however,
the War Department had sent ample warnings to the overseas
commanders, including General Short. . . . General Short at
no time informed the War Department that he was not in full
agreement with War Department estimates and plans for the
defense of Oahu.
Concerning the MAGIC messages, Gerow again warned that “it
was necessary to guard most carefully against compromising the
source of this extremely valuable intelligence.” 39 He did not recall
seeing the 13 parts of the Japanese reply to our ultimatum before
the morning of December 7.
38 Ibid., p. 96, Deane’s July 24, 1945, affi davit.
39 Ibid., p. 93.