Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

576 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
In June, at Mainz, Germany, Clausen tackled Walter Bedell
Smith, who had been Marshall’s staff secretary in December 1941
and had risen rapidly in the ranks. By then, he was a lieutenant
general and Eisenhower’s chief of staff . On December 6–7,
1941, Bedell Smith and his assistants were supposed to maintain
a 24-hour watch outside Marshall’s offi ce, know where Marshall
was at all times and see that important messages reached him
promptly. Clausen summarized, for Bedell Smith, Bratton’s testimony
before the APHB. Bedell Smith then gave Clausen an
affi davit setting forth, not his recollections of the pre-attack situation,
but rather his “usual practice” for handling the pouches of
sensitive material intended for Marshall. When
instructed that the contents should reach him at once . . . the
Duty Offi cer of the General Staff Secretariat would take the
pouches to General Marshall at his quarters or wherever he
happened to be. . . . Both I myself and the Assistant Secretaries
understood that these pouches contained information of such
value and importance that they should be shown to the Chief
of Staff without delay. 36
Bedell Smith had no recollection of having received, or known
of, an urgent delivery on the evening of December 6. “To the best
of my recollection,” he swore, “I left the offi ce at the usual time
on the evening of 6 Dec. 41, that is about 7:00 p.m., turning over
to the Night Duty Offi cer.” Bedell Smith was
quite certain that I was not at the offi ce after 10:00 p.m. If the
intercepted radio message referred to by Colonel Bratton was
delivered either to me or to the Night Duty Offi cer, it would
have been delivered in the locked envelope . . . to the Chief
of Staff in accordance with our usual procedure, either by the
offi cer on duty or by Colonel Bratton himself. 37
36 Ibid., p. 91. Smith’s June 15, 1945, affi davit.
37 Ibid.