Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 575
home asleep, as I did not see the implications of immediate
hostilities. 31
Dusenbury’s affi davit contradicted Bratton’s previous testimony
before both the APHB and the Clarke investigation.
Bratton had told Clarke that he had transmitted to the secretary
of state a copy of the fi rst 13 parts the night they were received. 32
Two weeks later, he had told the APHB that he had also delivered
the 13 parts “to the offi ce of the Chief of Staff [Marshall], [and]
the A.C. of S., G-2 [Miles].” 33 Th en a few days later, he had told
the APHB that he recalled that Marshall, Miles, and Gerow “got
their copies the evening of the 6th.” It was his practice, Bratton
said “to deliver to them their copies [of the Japanese intercepts]
before I went to the State Department.” 34
In March, Clausen secured the affi davit of Brigadier General
Charles K. Gailey, a major and Gerow’s executive offi cer on
December 6. Th e affi davit signed by Gailey, but unquestionably
drafted by Clausen, stated that it was Gailey’s “customary
practice” to deliver to Gerow “as soon as practicable” the deciphered
and translated Japanese intercepts received from Bratton
or Dusenbury. Gailey did “not recall having received any pouch or
intercepts from Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury or from
any other source” on the evening of December 6. Gailey was certain
that if Gerow hadn’t received any intercepts” that evening,
they hadn’t been delivered to him, “as, if they had been, I would
have given them to him [Gerow].” 35
Clausen then fl ew to the Pacifi c theater, Guam and Honolulu.
He was in the Philippines on V-E Day, and from there he fl ew to
Germany, France, Italy, and England.
31Ibid., pp. 25–26.
32Ibid., part 34, p. 21.
33Ibid., part 29, p. 2349.
34Ibid., p. 2421.
35Ibid., part 35, pp. 39–40.