Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

574 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
the procedure for distributing MAGIC, in order to discover who
was responsible for delivering to Marshall the crucial December
6–7 intercepts, and if they had not been promptly delivered, why
not. Clausen’s questions also indicated concern with the information
provided, or not provided, to Short.
For almost ten months, November 23, 1944, to September 12,
1945, Clausen “traveled over 55,000 miles by air and interviewed
92 Army, Navy and civilian personnel,” 52 of whom presented
their recollections of pre-Pearl Harbor events in sworn affi davits.
29 From time to time, Clausen reported to Stimson’s special
assistant. Major Clausen was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel by
March 24, 1945. 30
One of Clausen’s fi rst interviewees was Colonel Carlisle C.
Dusenbury, Bratton’s assistant. Dusenbury said he and Bratton
“alternated in assembling and delivering these intercepts . . . daily
about fi fty to seventy-fi ve of these intercepts . . . sorted to about
twenty-fi ve for distribution.” Dusenbury recalled that the 13
parts of the Japanese reply “started coming in on the night of 6
December 1941.” He and Bratton were both on duty. Dusenbury
said Bratton “remained until about half of it had been received.
Th ereupon, he left and went home at about 9 p.m.” Dusenbury
stayed and waited for the remainder.
Th e fourteenth part, being the fi nal part of the message, was
received about 12 that night. Th ereupon I left and went home.
. . . None of these parts comprising this intercept was delivered
before the morning of 7 December 1941 because the fi rst half
had been received while Colonel Bratton was on duty and he
had seen this and had not had it delivered that night. . . . I did
not wish to disturb the usual recipients who were probably at
29Ibid., p. 1, 20–21.
30Ibid., p. 10, Stimson March 24, 1944, memorandum.