Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 573
of the Rainbow Plan, A-2 [for U.S. naval participation] . . . . a
part of the joint Abducan plan only to be taken in the event of
war.” 24
Clarke presented his fi ndings to Marshall on September 20,
1944. When Marshall returned to the APHB (September 29 and
October 2), his memory was refreshed.
* * * *
The Clausen Investigation
(November 23, 1944–September 12, 1945)
Th e APHB report concluded that Marshall, Gerow, and
Short had failed in the performance of their duties. Both FDR
and Stimson had been shocked; they much preferred the Roberts
Commission fi ndings that Kimmel and Short were responsible
for the extent of the Pearl Harbor disaster. Th us, Stimson directed
Major Clausen, an attorney who had served as assistant recorder
for the APHB to look into “unexplored leads” in the Pearl Harbor
situation. 25 Th e investigation was to be limited “strictly to matters
which have a bearing on the part that Army personnel, organization,
or action may have had in the disaster.” 26 Clausen’s assignment
was classifi ed an “emergency war mission;” 27 he had an unlimited
expense account, permission to travel in and out of the war theaters;
persons interrogated by Clausen were to answer his inquiries
“fully;” all papers, secret or top secret, were to be “furnished
him, any present directives to the contrary notwithstanding.” 28 His
investigation appears to have been aimed primarily at exploring
24Ibid., part 34, pp. 60, 63. Testimony of Lt. Robert H. O’Dell.
25Ibid., part 35, p. 5.
26Ibid., p. 7, Stimson February 6, 1944, letter to Navy Secretary.
27Ibid., p. 9.
28Ibid., p. 5. Stimson’s directions to assistant chief of staff , G-2, re Clausen’s
assignment.