Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

572 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
with the Japanese that a surprise attack might be made anywhere,
certainly including Hawaii which had been armed and
prepared for such an attack for twenty years. 19
Bratton believed
that initially . . . any attack against an American installation in
the middle or eastern Pacifi c would be in the nature of a diversion
and having as its objective the immobilizing of any force
that we might call in to help the Dutch and British in west and
southwest Pacifi c, but . . . their primary initial objective was the
destruction of Great Britain’s power in southeast Asia. 20
Clarke questioned witnesses about the elusive “Winds
Execute.” Cryptanalyst Friedman had had no direct knowledge
of a “Winds Execute” himself, he had “only learned of it comparatively
recently in talking with Col. Sadtler and Capt. Saff ord
of the Navy.” 21 But he had known monitoring stations had been
alerted to watch for a “Winds Code” implementation. Further, he
said, a “diligent search,” if not “a completely exhaustive search,”
had failed to fi nd “a single bit of evidence to indicate that an
Army station actually intercepted a Winds Execute message.” 22
Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, chief of the Army Communications
Service at the time of the attack, told the inquiry he heard from
Admiral Noyes that “the message is in,” meaning that the “Winds
Execute” had been received, and it said “war would be declared
between Japan and Great Britain.” He didn’t say with the United
States also, but he couldn’t verify that for he didn’t know the word
in the Japanese text. 23 War was expected in the Netherlands East
Indies too; by December 5 “the Dutch had ordered the execution
19 Ibid., p. 71.
20 Ibid.
21Ibid., part 34, p. 34.
22Ibid., p. 36.
23Ibid., p. 68.