Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

570 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
directed to take Marshall’s “penciled draft” to the message center
and “have it sent immediately by the most expeditious means”
to the Philippines, Panama Canal, Hawaii and the West Coast
command. 9
Gerow told Clarke that G-2 (Army Intelligence), not his war
plans division, was to advise Hawaiian G-2 with respect to sabotage.
Th erefore, any reference to subversive activities and sabotage
had been “stricken out” of the November 27 “war warning.”
Gerow had considered that message “a defi nite warning to be on
the alert,” not only against sabotage, but also “against a possible
enemy off ensive.” Gerow admitted Short’s response left no room
for misunderstanding; he had defi nitely “taken all the necessary
precautions against sabotage” 10 —and sabotage only.
General Miles, acting assistant chief of staff , G-2, also testifi ed
for Clarke. Miles was thoroughly familiar with the MAGIC intercepts,
but his memory was “very hazy” about whether the “Winds
Message” had been implemented; he did “not remember seeing
any document on it, any written statement on it.” 11 According
to Miles, Bratton, chief of the Far Eastern section during this
period, selected the important Ultra information for Marshall. 12
Miles had known “we were watching for” the Japanese reply to
the November 26 U.S. ultimatum “very eagerly.” 13 He learned
during the evening of December 6 that it was in, and he had the
whole 14-part reply when he got to the offi ce the next morning.
Signs that war was coming had been apparent everywhere and
the War Department, Miles said, had even made plans for putting
censorship into operation and was training censors. 14
9 Ibid., p. 41.
10 Ibid., p. 40.
11 Ibid., p. 50.
12 Ibid., p. 49.
13 Ibid., p. 58.
14 Ibid., p. 58.