Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations 569
Bratton was also asked about the November 27 war warning
to Short and about what intelligence had been sent to Hawaii.
Bratton believed that Japan’s 14-part reply “started coming into
the Navy on the 6th,” and his recollection was that he “transmitted
a copy to the Secretary of State that night.” 5 When testifying,
Bratton referred to a memorandum he had prepared shortly
after December 7. 6 He described his eff orts to locate Marshall
that morning, Marshall’s arrival in his offi ce at 11:25 a.m., the
discussion then of the signifi cance of the “One p.m. Message,”
Marshall’s decision to notify Short, his consultation with CNO
Stark, and the transmission of the last-minute warning. 7
Clarke then questioned Colonel Edward F. French, Army
Communications Service, who had actually transmitted Marshall’s
last minute December 7 message to the fi eld commanders. Its
transmission was delayed, French said, as Marshall’s penciled
draft was “rather diffi cult to read” and it had to be typed, “verifi
ed and authenticated” before being encoded. “[O]ur channel at
Honolulu was out, due to atmospheric conditions.” To “avoid the
risk of any garbling or error in relaying the message via Army
facilities through San Francisco,” French decided “the quickest
method of dispatch would be via commercial service.” So the
message to Hawaii was “handled directly to San Francisco via the
Western Union and on a tube relay of this message to the RCA
offi ce in San Francisco.” 8
Major General Gerow, assistant chief of staff , war plans division,
presented Clarke with a memorandum he had prepared
December 15, 1941 concerning the “One p.m. Message”: “On
Sunday, December 7, 1941, about 11:30 a.m., E.S.T., General
Marshall called me to his offi ce.” Bratton was there and was
5 Ibid., p. 21.
6 Ibid., p. 19.
7 Ibid., pp. 10, 19–20, 20–21.
8 Ibid., pp. 32–33.