Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

568 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Clausen and Hewitt investigations was a desire to uncover information
that might contradict, discredit, or at least cast doubts on
the fi ndings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and Navy Court of
Inquiry, which the administration had found unacceptable.
The Clarke Inquiry (September 14–20, 1944)
After the APHB learned of the Japanese intercepts, Marshall
was again called to answer questions. In preparation for that
appearance, Marshall asked Colonel Carter W. Clarke to explore
the “manner in which certain Top Secret communications were
handled.” 4 Marshall hadn’t been able to recall the extremely
important Japanese reply to the U.S. November 26 “ultimatum”
prior to the morning of December 7. Yet several witnesses had
reported that the fi rst 13 parts (of that 14-part reply) had been
received and delivered to top Washington offi cials the evening of
December 6. Marshall was also interested in reviewing the events
of the morning of December 7 and his response to the radiogram
advising the Japanese ambassadors to deliver their government’s
reply to Secretary of State Hull on December 7 at precisely
1:00 p.m., Washington time. Clarke interviewed eleven witnesses
who had been involved with the receipt and distribution of the
intercepts.
Marshall had Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, Army intelligence
(G-2), recalled from the European theater where he was then
serving. Bratton had been responsible for the pre-Pearl Harbor
distribution of intercepts to Army personnel. Bratton described
the procedure for distributing various Japanese intercepts to
the top military and civilian offi cials in Washington, including
President Roosevelt, Marshall, and the secretaries of state, war,
and navy.
4 Ibid., part 34, p. 1.