Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ... Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
567 25. Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations: Clarke, Clausen, Hewitt Each of the three supplementary investigations was unique. Th e fi rst of these three supplementary investigations, the Clarke Investigation, was launched at the request of Army Chief of Staff Marshall, while the APHB was still under way, to help him prepare for his next appearance before that board. 1 Th e second investigation, the Clausen Investigation, was instigated by Secretary of War Stimson to look into “unexplored leads” in the Pearl Harbor situation from the Army’s point of view. 2 Th e third investigation, the Hewitt Inquiry, dealt primarily with the Navy’s situation and was ordered by Navy Secretary Forrestal who had found the NCI investigation had not exhausted all possible evidence. 3 Implicit, if not explicit, in the directives setting up the 179th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Offi ce, 1946), part 34, p. 2. 2Ibid., part 35, p. 5. 3Ibid., part 36, p. 359, Forrestal’s May 2,1945, memorandum to Admiral H. Kent Hewitt.
568 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Clausen and Hewitt investigations was a desire to uncover information that might contradict, discredit, or at least cast doubts on the fi ndings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and Navy Court of Inquiry, which the administration had found unacceptable. The Clarke Inquiry (September 14–20, 1944) After the APHB learned of the Japanese intercepts, Marshall was again called to answer questions. In preparation for that appearance, Marshall asked Colonel Carter W. Clarke to explore the “manner in which certain Top Secret communications were handled.” 4 Marshall hadn’t been able to recall the extremely important Japanese reply to the U.S. November 26 “ultimatum” prior to the morning of December 7. Yet several witnesses had reported that the fi rst 13 parts (of that 14-part reply) had been received and delivered to top Washington offi cials the evening of December 6. Marshall was also interested in reviewing the events of the morning of December 7 and his response to the radiogram advising the Japanese ambassadors to deliver their government’s reply to Secretary of State Hull on December 7 at precisely 1:00 p.m., Washington time. Clarke interviewed eleven witnesses who had been involved with the receipt and distribution of the intercepts. Marshall had Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, Army intelligence (G-2), recalled from the European theater where he was then serving. Bratton had been responsible for the pre-Pearl Harbor distribution of intercepts to Army personnel. Bratton described the procedure for distributing various Japanese intercepts to the top military and civilian offi cials in Washington, including President Roosevelt, Marshall, and the secretaries of state, war, and navy. 4 Ibid., part 34, p. 1.
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567<br />
25.<br />
Administration Directed<br />
Supplementary Investigations:<br />
Clarke, Clausen, Hewitt<br />
Each <strong>of</strong> the three supplementary investigations was unique.<br />
Th e fi rst <strong>of</strong> these three supplementary investigations, the<br />
Clarke Investigation, was launched at the request <strong>of</strong> Army<br />
Chief <strong>of</strong> Staff Marshall, while the APHB was still under way, to<br />
help him prepare for his next appearance before that board. 1 Th e<br />
second investigation, the Clausen Investigation, was instigated by<br />
Secretary <strong>of</strong> War Stimson to look into “unexplored leads” in the<br />
<strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> situation from the Army’s point <strong>of</strong> view. 2 Th e third<br />
investigation, the Hewitt Inquiry, dealt primarily with the Navy’s<br />
situation <strong>and</strong> was ordered by Navy Secretary Forrestal who had<br />
found the NCI investigation had not exhausted all possible evidence.<br />
3 Implicit, if not explicit, in the directives setting up the<br />
179th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation<br />
<strong>of</strong> the <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack. <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.:<br />
U.S. Government Printing Offi ce, 1946), part 34, p. 2.<br />
2Ibid., part 35, p. 5.<br />
3Ibid., part 36, p. 359, Forrestal’s May 2,1945, memor<strong>and</strong>um to Admiral H.<br />
Kent Hewitt.