Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

36 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
U.S. Encourages British Military Purchases
Britain’s and France’s “cash and carry” purchases permitted
under the 1939 Neutrality Act were a stimulus to U.S. producers
of arms and other military supplies. Th ose huge sales had relieved
much of the mass unemployment that had plagued this country
since the Depression and that FDR’s New Deal had failed to
solve. But with the fall of France, only the British were still in a
position to buy, and they were fast running out of cash. Roosevelt
feared that if their purchases came to an end, mass unemployment
would return. He was looking for ways to keep workers
employed when the British could no longer pay cash.
On July 3 Lord Lothian, British ambassador to the United
States, presented to the State Department a formal statement on
the status of his country’s fi nances. Britain was overcommitted.
Th e United Kingdom would pay as long as she could, but
in all frankness . . . it will be utterly impossible for them [His
Majesty’s Government] to continue to do this for any indefi -
nite period. . . . Th is was not a request for credit. Th e United
States Ambassador in London had warned that such a request
would be unwise.
Rather, it refl ected British concern with their need to enter
into long-term contracts so as to feel confi dent of their sources of
supply. Th e British were reassured by Washington offi cials. “Lord
Lothian was told informally ten days later ‘not to worry too much’
on the score of dollars.” 16
According to U.S. Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, the president
personally charged him “with the responsibility of seeing
that everything be done for them [the British] so that they could
16 H. Duncan Hall, North American Supply (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery
Offi ce; Longmans, Green, 1955), p. 243.