Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

1944: A Political Year 563
that General Short should be court-martialled, his friends are
convinced that he would be vindicated. 45
Finally on November 30, after Stimson and Forrestal had
made some further revisions, the president approved their
respective statements and authorized their release. Stimson and
Forrestal planned to issue them simultaneously within the next
two or three days. 46
On December 1, the Army and Navy released to the public
their statements on the fi ndings of the APHB and NCI investigations.
47 According to the New York Times (December 2, 1944),
Stimson and Forrestal revealed that they had
found no evidence to justify a court-martial of Maj. Gen.
Walter C. Short and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. . . .
Both Secretaries were careful to speak of the evidence “now”
available, and promised further investigation to obtain every
bit of testimony. . . . On the ground of national security, both
Secretaries refused to make the real story of Pearl Harbor public
until the war had ended. Mr. Stimson considered it “highly
prejudicial to war prosecution and the safety of American lives”
to disclose it beforehand. Th e Navy Department said tersely
that the record of the Court of Inquiry “will not be made public”
while the war continued.
In their individual statements, Secretaries Stimson and
Forrestal conceded errors on the part of unnamed offi cers at
Pearl Harbor and in Washington. Th ese offi cers, Mr. Stimson
stated, “did not perform their duties with the necessary skill
or exercise the judgment needed.” Mr. Forrestal sponsored a
statement that there were “errors of judgement” by offi cers of
his service.
45 Th e New York Times, November 26, 1944, p. 44.
46 Stimson Diary, vol. 49, p. 62, November 30, 1944.
47 Th e New York Times, December 2, 1944, p. 5.