Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

1944: A Political Year 561
stand as the fi nal word. Th ey both authorized follow-up in-service
investigations. On the oral instructions of Marshall, Carter
Clarke was asked to explore “the manner in which Top Secret
communications were handled.” 40 Stimson directed Major Henry
C. Clausen to investigate “Unexplored Leads in Pearl Harbor
Investigation.” 41 And Admiral Kent H. Hewitt was asked to
conduct “Further investigation of facts pertinent to the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor.” 42
Stimson’s and Forrestal’s stalling tactics succeeded. No releases
about the reports were issued before the election.
On November 7 FDR won reelection for a fourth term.
FDR’s Decides How and When to
Release NCI and APHB Reports
Th e president was to cast the decisive vote on how the NCI
and APHB reports were to be presented to the press. Finally on
November 21, Stimson had a chance to talk with FDR and to
show him his draft announcement about the Army’s Pearl Harbor
report. Th e president had evidently already seen and approved
of Forrestal’s proposed noncommittal release. FDR thought “the
less said the better.” Stimson said the War Department “could
not aff ord to go ahead and be frank when the Navy was not
being frank.” And he thought the best hope for “keeping off a
Congressional investigation was to make such a disclosure as I
proposed to do.” 43
Stimson showed Roosevelt the conclusions of the Grunert
board, and FDR read them carefully. When he saw the names of
the persons the Army Board had criticized, he said, “Why, this
40 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 34, p. 2.
41 Ibid., part 35, p. 6.
42 Ibid., part 36, p. 359.
43 Ibid. pp. 39–40, November 21, 1944.