Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

560 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Sooner or later, of course, offi cial statements about the Army
and Navy reports would have to be issued. But from the point
of view of the secretaries, later was better than sooner. Th ey agonized
for weeks over how to word their releases. Th ey consulted.
Th ey composed several draft statements. And they agreed that
their announcements should be coordinated and issued simultaneously.
But they disagreed as to how frank they should be.
Navy Secretary Forrestal, apparently under the infl uence of
King, leaned toward making no mention at all of any NCI criticism
of Washington offi cials. Secretary of War Stimson felt that
he should at least acknowledge that the APHB had criticized
Washington offi cials, including Marshall. But Stimson expected
to explain, at the time of making such an acknowledgment, that
the charges had not been justifi ed. However, his recommendation
for acknowledging the APHB criticism of Marshall met opposition
in the War Department. 37 Stimson reasoned that
if we do not take the initiative ourselves and publish the fact
that Marshall has been criticized at the same time with the
vindication of it, why it will leak out in a much more disadvantageous
way from the enemies who are already in possession of
the secret. 38
According to Stimson, Marshall, who “has most to lose by the
publicity which would come out of it,” favored Stimson’s version
as “altogether the wisest thing.” 39
Unfinished Army and Navy Business
Neither the Army nor the Navy was willing to let the fi ndings
of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and Navy Court of Inquiry
37Ibid., p. 27, November 15, 1944, and p. 36, November 20, 1944.
38Ibid., p. 36, November 20, 1944.
39Ibid., p. 42, November 22, 1944.