Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

1944: A Political Year 559
that the part made public was incomplete, and that withholding
of any information is indicative of a desire on the part of
the Navy to “whitewash” high naval offi cers. A situation such as
this might well lead to discussions that would inadvertently disclose
just the information that we feel is vital to keep secret.
King pointed out that the law calling for the NCI “does not
obligate the Secretary of the Navy to make any public statement
of what the Court of Inquiry has ascertained.” Th erefore, he concluded,
“there is no necessity for making anything public. 31 (Italics
added. )
Stimson worried a great deal about how to handle the APHB
report. He resented Congress for having “quite unnecessarily
thrown” on him “this wretched piece of labor . . . the most wearing
and rasping thing that I have had in the four years that I have
been here.” 32 He referred to this task in his diary variously as his
“cross,” 33 and as “[t]he miserable Pearl Harbor business.” 34 He had
had to spend his time “stopping rat-holes” because of “[t]he confounded
Pearl Harbor case.” 35
Th e analyses of the APHB by Cramer and of the NCI by
Gatch and King provided Stimson and Forrestal with the rationale
they needed to reverse the APHB and NCI fi ndings, to
once more place the blame for the extent of the disaster on the
Hawaiian commanders, and to vindicate the acts of Washington
offi cials. Stimson considered Cramer’s analysis “a very fi ne job—
really a humdinger . . . a very good help. . . . [H]e handled the
Pearl Harbor Board without gloves and had analyzed very carefully
and yet fairly all their mistakes.” 36
31 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 39, pp. 333–34.
32 Stimson Diary, vol. 49, p. 22, November 11, 1944.
33 Ibid., p. 36, November 20, 1944.
34 Ibid., p. 47, November 24, 1944.
35 Ibid., p. 51, November 27, 1944.
36 Ibid., p. 49, November 24, 1944.