Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

1944: A Political Year 557
Forrestal and Stimson Consult
Army and Navy Legal Experts
Even as Forrestal was announcing that the NCI report would
not be made public, information about it was being leaked. Th e
same New York Times story that reported Forrestal’s intentions to
keep the report confi dential told of reports that had “come from
some quarters in recent months, and sometimes with a political
background,” that “revelation of all details of the Pearl Harbor
attack would clear Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Lieut.
Gen. Walter C. Short of suspicion and, on the other hand, cast
discredit on the administration” 23 —this in direct contradiction
to the fi ndings of the pro-administration Roberts Commission.
Th us, the release of secret or top-secret information might not
only endanger the military but, if the reports really did clear
Kimmel and Short and “cast discredit” on the administration,
could prove a serious embarrassment to the administration in the
coming presidential election.
Forrestal asked the opinion of the Navy’s senior legal offi cer,
Judge Advocate General T.L. Gatch, 24 and of [Commander in
Chief, Atlantic Fleet] King. 25 Th e Army consulted its top legal
adviser, Judge Advocate Major General Myron C. Cramer, who
wrote a long memorandum for the secretary of war. 26 Th ese men
concluded that certain portions of the reports should not be
released in any case.
Cramer, Gatch, and King all went over the APHB and NCI
hearings and reports. In reporting to Forrestal and Stimson,
they held that the two boards had been in error in maintaining
that insuffi cient information had been supplied the Hawaiian
23 Th e New York Times, October 21, 1944, p. 9.
24 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 39, pp. 330–32.
25 Ibid., pp. 332–35.
26 Ibid., pp. 231–69.