Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

556 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
on November 26, in spite of the “eff orts of the War and Navy
Departments to gain time for preparations for war,” 17 also
Marshall 18 and Gerow 19 for not having kept Short adequately
informed.
On receipt of these reports, the two secretaries faced a
dilemma. To make the reports public would reveal to the Japanese
that we had broken their codes. To refuse to make them public
would lead people to think the administration had something to
hide, especially in view of the rumors circulating that the reports
would absolve the two Pearl Harbor commanders of blame and
shift the responsibility to Washington. Th e immediate response
of the secretaries was to refuse to release the reports at that time.
Parts of both reports were classifi ed “Secret” and “Top Secret,” so
they pleaded reasons of security. 20
Forrestal acknowledged receipt of the NCI report to Admiral
Orin G. Murfi n, president of the Naval Court. He would “personally
examine the report and record of the Naval Court after
they had been examined and approved by the Judge Advocate of
the Navy” as to legal form. He would consult also with Admiral
Ernest J. King, commander-in-chief of the United States Fleet
and chief of naval operations, “to ascertain how much of this
material suffi ciently aff ected present military operations as to
merit a security classifi cation.” In the meantime, “pending inspection,”
the report would not be made available to the public. 21
Th e War Department proposed a commission to rule on the
“Top Secret” issue. 22
17 Ibid., pp. 135ff ., 175.
18 Ibid., pp. 144ff ., 175.
19 Ibid., pp. 142ff ., 176.
20Th e New York Times, October 21, 1944, p. 9.
21Ibid., October 21, 1944, pp. 1, 9.
22Stimson Diary, vol. 48, p. 186, October 26, 1944.