Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

1944: A Political Year 553
Dewey read no further before handing the letter back to
Clarke. He felt he could not accept the proviso that he not communicate
its contents to any other person. 7
Marshall discussed the situation with Clarke and General
Bissell, head of army intelligence. Th ey concluded that “the matter
was so important that we must make it a matter of record.”
So Marshall again sent Clarke, traveling in civvies, to see Dewey,
by then in Albany. Clarke phoned Marshall from Dewey’s offi ce,
saying Dewey was unwilling to read the letter unless he could
share the information with at least one adviser and be permitted
to retain the letter in his fi les. Marshall agreed. 8 Dewey then read
the letter.
Marshall wrote that he would have
preferred to talk to you in person but I could not devise a
method that would not be subject to press and radio reactions
as to why the Chief of Staff of the Army would be seeking an
interview with you at this particular moment. . . . Th e most vital
evidence in the Pearl Harbor matter consists of our intercepts
of the Japanese diplomatic communications.
Over a period of several years, Marshall wrote, “our cryptograph
people” had succeeded in reproducing a copy of the Japanese
encoding machine so that we could decipher the Japanese diplomatic
code. Th e Japanese were still using the same code, and this
source was providing us with a great deal of valuable information.
It had helped us to win victories at Midway, in the Aleutians;
it told us of the movements of Japanese convoys and helped us
in raiding Japanese shipping. Marshall told also of the serious
consequences when the OSS had secretly searched the Japanese
Embassy in Portugal. As a result of that incident, the Japanese
7 Ibid., p. 1133.
8 Ibid., p. 1135.