Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

1944: A Political Year 551
long trips during the campaign. Travel for President Roosevelt
was not strenuous, as it was for common folks; rather it was a
time of rest and relaxation, on trains in comfortable private cars
or aboard luxurious ships in fresh ocean air and sunshine.
The Democrats’ Dilemma
In political campaigns, both parties expect crises. However,
FDR and his administration faced two potential crises of which
the American people were completely unaware. Both concerned
the super-secret Japanese MAGIC intercepts. In the fi rst place,
the administration feared the reaction of the voters if they learned
at this juncture, in the middle of the war, that Washington offi cials
had been intercepting, deciphering, and reading secret Japanese
messages as early as 1940 and that, therefore, they had known a
great deal about Japanese intentions before the attack on Pearl
Harbor. Why, then, the people would ask, hadn’t Washington
offi cials adequately alerted the Hawaiian commanders? Why
hadn’t they seen to it that the fl eet at Pearl Harbor was better
provided with the information, men, weapons, and planes needed
to resist attack? After having lost thousands of loved ones at Pearl
Harbor and after having lived through almost three years of war,
how would the voters feel toward the president and his fellow
Democrats? Would they feel revulsion at having been deceived
and betrayed? And would they express that revulsion at the ballot
box in the coming election? Would they vote for the Republican
candidate and against FDR?
In the second place, the administration feared the consequences
for the war eff ort. What if the Japanese learned that the
United States was able to decipher some of Japan’s super-secret
codes, codes she was still using to send messages to her diplomatic
and military personnel throughout the world? If Japan
realized that the United States was continuing to read many of
her most private communications, she would change her codes