Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

546 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Navy Court of Inquiry Report
Th e court completed taking testimony on September 27
and issued its report on October 19, 1944. In the course of 19
“Findings of Facts,” it reviewed the information revealed in the
NCI’s nine and a half weeks of hearings ( July 24 to September
27). 196
Th e NCI concluded that
Admiral Kimmel’s decision, made after receiving the dispatch
of 24 November, to continue preparations of the Pacifi c Fleet
for war, was sound in the light of the information then available
to him. . . . [A]lthough the attack of 7 December came as
a surprise, there were good grounds for the belief on the part of
high offi cials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and on
the part of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, that hostilities
would begin in the Far East rather than elsewhere, and
that the same considerations which infl uenced the sentiment
of the authorities in Washington in this respect, support the
interpretation which Admiral Kimmel placed upon the “war
warning message” of 27 November, to the eff ect that this message
directed attention away from Pearl Harbor rather than
toward it. . . .
[T]he Court is of the opinion that Admiral Harold R. Stark. . . .
failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in that he
did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief,
Pacifi c Fleet, during the very critical period 26 November to 7
December, important information which he had regarding the
Japanese situation and, especially, in that, on the morning of 7
December, 1941, he did not transmit immediately the fact that
a message had been received which appeared to indicate that a
break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that an attack
in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon. . . .
196 Ibid., part 39, pp. 297–322, Addendum, pp. 323–30.