Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24–October 19, 1944) 545
“[T]he effi ciency of the Japanese Air Force” was, Kimmel
thought, “a surprise to the Navy Department as well as to the
people in Hawaii. We had on the ships no adequate antiaircraft
defense.” 193 Nor did we have suffi cient patrol planes “to maintain
an adequate patrol over a long period of time. . . . [A] patrol out to
300 miles or less is of very doubtful value,” Kimmel said, “particularly
against air raid.” It was “almost useless,” he added. Kimmel
wanted it “clearly understood” that giving the orders to the planes
was his responsibility; he had used them to protect operating areas
and in training in preparation for war. He believed that
by my doing so we were employing them to the very best
advantage. . . . Of course, had the patrol planes, plus all the
Army bombers, been out on search, we would not have had any
striking force left. 194
To detect a carrier force, it was necessary to know that it was
on the way and also its approximate time of arrival at a certain
place. To confi rm the diffi culty of locating an incoming force,
Kimmel mentioned several attacks, just within the previous three
or four weeks, when “our own Navy has gone in and made attacks
on Japanese-held positions at Saipan, Palau, and Manila.” In each
case our planes “eff ected what amounts to a tactical surprise.” And
this in spite of the fact that the Japanese should have been on the
alert for we had been at war for nearly three years.
193 Ibid.
[W]hat is so often overlooked in connection with this Pearl
Harbor aff air is that we were still at peace and still conducting
conversations. . . . We were still in the peace psychology, and I
myself, was aff ected by it just like everybody else. 195
194 Ibid., p. 662.
195 Ibid., p. 663.