Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

544 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
in all probability, had the Fleet put to sea . . . probably 300
miles west of Oahu in an intercepting position for any attacking
force that would have come either to the northward or to
the southward.
He couldn’t put them too far away, for he had to consider
their fueling. But he would have put them “just far enough so
they couldn’t be readily located.” He was “torn betwixt a desire for
the security of the Fleet and for preparations to make the initial
moves in case of war with Japan. . . . Any Fleet which sits and
waits to be attacked,” Kimmel added, “labors under an enormous
handicap.” However, he thought it “fair” to say that he “would
have alerted everything on shore to its maximum that could be
maintained over a long period.” He would have “instituted the
reconnaissance to the best of our ability and I would have had the
Fleet put to sea.” 191
Kimmel added, however, that it was “well within the realm
of possibility that had I taken the Fleet to sea, the losses could
have been greater than they actually were from submarine and air
attack [in the harbor]. However, you must also realize,” he said,
that you presuppose then that they would have found our Fleet
and that they would have been able to deliver an attack. It is
not impossible that, had the Fleet gone to sea, the Japanese
would not have attacked at that time at all. Th ey might have
deferred the attack. We all know how diffi cult it is to locate a
Fleet at sea, particularly if they do not want to be located. All
this is in the realm of conjecture, but I think it is fair to say that
there are some things to be said for keeping the Fleet in port,
and the only change we would make would be to go to a little
higher state of alert than we had at the time. 192
191Ibid., part 32, p. 659.
192Ibid., p. 661.