Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24–October 19, 1944) 543
Pearl Harbor area but that they were interested in exactly where
they were in Pearl Harbor proper.” 188
Th ere were only two “eff ective” forms of attack against ships
in Pearl Harbor itself. One would be for submarines actually to
enter the harbor. At that time Kimmel would have “discounted
largely” that possibility because he didn’t know they had midget
submarines. He would also have discounted the possibility of an
aircraft torpedo attack. He “would have considered that about
the only thing that could get in would be a bombing attack.”
Th erefore, if he had known about the Japanese messages asking
about the specifi c locations of ships in the harbor, he would have
concluded, “Well, they probably are going to make an air bombing
raid here.” Kimmel could not see “any other conclusion you
can draw from it, unless you put it down to Japanese stupidity in
wanting all this information.” And Kimmel did not “think they
were so stupid.” 189
With respect to the “Winds Code Message,” Kimmel said
he did not want to appear “to be so wise now that everything has
happened.” But still, he said, he had
a right to an opinion. . . . Th e defi nite fact that Japan, at least, was
going to break off diplomatic relations and, at most, was going
to war with us would have had a very great eff ect on me and all
my advisors. Th at would have been something defi nite. 190
What would Kimmel have done if he had been privy to the
intelligence available in the secret intercepts that had been introduced
to the NCI? He said that was “a very diffi cult question to
answer . . . after the fact.” However, he was sure he would at least
have alerted all shore-going activities in the Hawaiian Islands,
including the Army. He would have
188Ibid., part 33, p. 920.
189Ibid., pp. 920–21.
190Ibid., p. 921.