Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24–October 19, 1944) 541
and then sent, with little threat to security. 181 But that hadn’t been
done either.
Kimmel Reviews Pre-attack
Pearl Harbor Situation
Admiral Kimmel said he had received none of the secret
Japanese intercepts introduced to the NCI that had been received
in Washington between November 1 and December 7, 1941. 182
He had, of course, received the November 27 “war warning”
dispatch. In response to that, on November 30 he set forth in a
memorandum “the action which we would take in case hostilities
should suddenly break out.” He thought that “it was well to be
prepared and ready to take action immediately.” Th ese plans were
revised as necessary from time to time and on December 5, a new
memorandum was “prepared and approved and put in the hands
of the Staff Duty Offi cer . . . so that he would know exactly what
to do . . . in case of an emergency.” 183
Kimmel reviewed again the situation at Pearl Harbor in the
months preceding the attack. 184 During the months preceding the
attack, Stark sent Kimmel a number of rather general warnings
concerning the Japanese threat in the Pacifi c. In Washington, tension
was building toward the end of November; many Japanese
messages were being intercepted, decrypted, and translated every
day off ered clues to the thinking of the Tokyo government.
Th ose privy to this ultra secret MAGIC were well aware that
the Japanese were planning some kind of aggressive action. Yet
in spite of Kimmel’s frequent requests to Stark for information,
181Ibid., pp. 915, 918.
182Ibid., part 32, p. 654.
183Ibid., p. 653.
184Ibid., pp. 658–59.