Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

540 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
San Francisco concerning the movements of U.S. ships into and
out of those harbors were introduced into the record. 175 Admiral
Joseph R. Redman, Assistant Director of Communications, was
asked if there were other similar reports to Tokyo.
Redman: Why, the general tenor of the Japanese traffi c was in
a searching expedition all over the world as to the movements
not only in United States ports but also in those of foreign countries.
[It had been going on for some time.] During the several
months preceding December, 1941, it was intensifi ed. 176
Redman admitted that the November 16 Honolulu to Tokyo
message concerning the location of ships in Pearl Harbor had
been “more specifi c” than the other Japanese messages he had
seen reporting on ship movements, 177 even more specifi c than any
answer from Manila, “because this apparently referred to some
particular chart upon which he was reporting.” 178
Redman was asked, “Can you give the court any reasons why
that [diplomatic traffi c] should not have been transmitted to all
commanders in the Pacifi c, including the coastal frontier commanders
on the Pacifi c Coast?” 179 After some discussion of the
diffi culty of retaining security if messages were recorded wordfor-word,
or if they were sent by airmail, Redman fi nally admitted
that the information could have been sent by courier. But a
courier wasn’t used. 180 Or it could have been briefed, encoded,
175 Ibid., pp. 908 and Exhibit #68, pp. 1391–96. For more complete compilation
of such messages including those not made available to NCI, see part 12, pp.
270–310.
176 Ibid., part 33, pp. 914–15.
177 Ibid., Japanese Intercept #222, translated December 6, 1941, pp. 1384–85.
178 Ibid., p. 917.
179 Ibid., p. 915.
180 Ibid., p. 917.