Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ... Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24–October 19, 1944) 537 Q. But were you expecting any information of importance immediately preceding 7 December 1941, from the Japanese government? Noyes: I might say we were hoping. I couldn’t say we were expecting. 168 Had Noyes seen or been informed about parts 1 to 13 of the Japanese reply, intercepted, decoded, and delivered to top Washington offi cials during the evening of December 6? He said he had not seen or been informed of the subject matter before December 7. He did not know where he was after working hours on the night of December 6. Nor did he know whether he went back to the offi ce or stayed home. Q. But your present recollection is that you have no knowledge of having seen that document, Parts 1 to 13, on the night of 6 December 1941? Noyes: Th at is my recollection. Asked about part 14, he replied, “Th is message wasn’t translated until the 7th of December.” Q. Had you ever been informed of it at any time, and if so, when? Noyes: I will have to say I don’t remember. Noyes said he did not see the “One p.m. Message” instructing the Japanese ambassadors to deliver their government’s reply to the secretary of state at that time until after 7 December. 169 Asked if the Navy had facilities in Pearl Harbor for intercepting information in the Purple code, which was usually sent by 168Ibid., pp. 895–96. 169Ibid., p. 896.
538 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy cable, Noyes replied, “At the time there were no legal facilities [in Pearl Harbor] for intercepting cable. . . .” Q. Do I understand your answer to mean that they were not receiving these cable dispatches transmitted in the purple code? Noyes: I should say they probably were not. 170 Q. Did you ever inform the Chief of the War Plans Division, Captain Turner, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacifi c Fleet was decrypting intelligence information of a character similar to that which you were receiving in the Navy Department? Noyes: No. 171 When Noyes was asked “whether any of the code words as set out in document 15 [the “Winds Code” set-up message] were received in the Navy Department, either in Japanese or in plain English?” that is whether there had been a “Winds Code Execute,” he replied, “Th ey were not.” 172 Testimony had been presented “before this court to the eff ect that the execution of the winds code system was received and that a thorough search in the Navy Department fi les had failed to reveal a copy of the execution signal.” Noyes was asked about that: “Would the Director of Naval Communications fi les be the normal placed in which that record would be kept?” Noyes: If it was received by naval means, yes. . . . Otherwise, the Offi ce of Naval Intelligence. 170 Ibid., p. 898. 171 Ibid., p. 897. 172 Ibid., p. 894.
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538 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />
cable, Noyes replied, “At the time there were no legal facilities [in<br />
<strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>] for intercepting cable. . . .”<br />
Q. Do I underst<strong>and</strong> your answer to mean that they were not<br />
receiving these cable dispatches transmitted in the purple<br />
code?<br />
Noyes: I should say they probably were not. 170<br />
Q. Did you ever inform the Chief <strong>of</strong> the War Plans Division,<br />
Captain Turner, that the Comm<strong>and</strong>er-in-Chief <strong>of</strong> the Pacifi c<br />
Fleet was decrypting intelligence information <strong>of</strong> a character<br />
similar to that which you were receiving in the Navy<br />
Department?<br />
Noyes: No. 171<br />
When Noyes was asked “whether any <strong>of</strong> the code words as<br />
set out in document 15 [the “Winds Code” set-up message]<br />
were received in the Navy Department, either in Japanese or in<br />
plain English?” that is whether there had been a “Winds Code<br />
Execute,” he replied, “Th ey were not.” 172<br />
Testimony had been presented “before this court to the eff ect<br />
that the execution <strong>of</strong> the winds code system was received <strong>and</strong><br />
that a thorough search in the Navy Department fi les had failed<br />
to reveal a copy <strong>of</strong> the execution signal.” Noyes was asked about<br />
that: “Would the Director <strong>of</strong> Naval Communications fi les be the<br />
normal placed in which that record would be kept?”<br />
Noyes: If it was received by naval means, yes. . . . Otherwise, the<br />
Offi ce <strong>of</strong> Naval Intelligence.<br />
170 Ibid., p. 898.<br />
171 Ibid., p. 897.<br />
172 Ibid., p. 894.