Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24–October 19, 1944) 537
Q. But were you expecting any information of importance
immediately preceding 7 December 1941, from the Japanese
government?
Noyes: I might say we were hoping. I couldn’t say we were
expecting. 168
Had Noyes seen or been informed about parts 1 to 13 of
the Japanese reply, intercepted, decoded, and delivered to top
Washington offi cials during the evening of December 6? He said
he had not seen or been informed of the subject matter before
December 7. He did not know where he was after working hours
on the night of December 6. Nor did he know whether he went
back to the offi ce or stayed home.
Q. But your present recollection is that you have no knowledge
of having seen that document, Parts 1 to 13, on the night of 6
December 1941?
Noyes: Th at is my recollection.
Asked about part 14, he replied, “Th is message wasn’t translated
until the 7th of December.”
Q. Had you ever been informed of it at any time, and if so,
when?
Noyes: I will have to say I don’t remember.
Noyes said he did not see the “One p.m. Message” instructing
the Japanese ambassadors to deliver their government’s reply to
the secretary of state at that time until after 7 December. 169
Asked if the Navy had facilities in Pearl Harbor for intercepting
information in the Purple code, which was usually sent by
168Ibid., pp. 895–96.
169Ibid., p. 896.