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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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Foreign Relations in an Election Year 33<br />

When Churchill saw a copy <strong>of</strong> this secret message, he wired<br />

Roosevelt that he considered it “absolutely vital that this message<br />

should be published tomorrow, June 14, in order that it may play<br />

the decisive part in turning the course <strong>of</strong> world history.” 9 Th en<br />

Roosevelt must have realized that he had exceeded his authority<br />

in giving such an assurance to a belligerent nation. He wired<br />

Ambassador Kennedy in London:<br />

My message to Reynaud not to be published in any circumstances.<br />

. . . It was in no sense intended to commit <strong>and</strong> does not<br />

commit this Government to the slightest military activities in<br />

support <strong>of</strong> the Allies. . . . Th ere is <strong>of</strong> course no authority except<br />

in Congress to make any commitment <strong>of</strong> this nature. 10<br />

German troops entered Paris on June 14, 1940. On June 17<br />

the French sued for peace. France <strong>and</strong> Germany signed an armistice<br />

fi ve days later. France had fallen.<br />

FDR Moves toward a Third Term as President<br />

Since February 1940, FDR had been hinting to various friends<br />

<strong>and</strong> confi dants that he might run for a third term, thus breaking<br />

with the precedent set by George Washington <strong>and</strong> followed<br />

by all succeeding U.S. presidents. He made no public announcement,<br />

but he had apparently settled the matter in his own mind<br />

by June.<br />

Because <strong>of</strong> the international situation, the fall <strong>of</strong> France,<br />

<strong>and</strong> his unannounced intentions, FDR considered it important<br />

to have a united country. He decided to replace the two cabinet<br />

<strong>of</strong>fi cers who had obstructed some <strong>of</strong> his foreign-policy initiatives<br />

<strong>and</strong> make his cabinet bipartisan. Roosevelt maneuvered the<br />

9 Joseph P. Lash, Roosevelt <strong>and</strong> Churchill, 1939–1941: Th e Partnership Th at Saved<br />

the West (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976), p.185.<br />

10 Department <strong>of</strong> State, Diplomatic Papers, 1940, p. 250.

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