Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

536 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
no specifi c event that occurred on the morning of the 4th that
caused me to send this dispatch. 163
When Biesemeier asked Noyes whether he had seen the
“Winds Code” setup intercept on or after November 28, Noyes
said he had and that he “took steps to get immediate notice from
our intercept stations to cover this point.” 164 Th is response was
consistent with Kramer’s testimony that Noyes had had cards
made up with the Winds code words on them. 165 However, when
asked later about the cards, Noyes “couldn’t say.” 166
Had Noyes known before the attack of the secretary of state’s
November 26 proposal to the Japanese?
Noyes: I couldn’t say whether I was familiar with this particular
paper or not. . . . Th at is three years ago. I can’t say on what day.
Th is traffi c which has my initials, and things that I prepared, I
am glad to testify to, but I cannot say exactly when I saw or if I
did see many of these hundreds of dispatches. 167
Q. We have testimony before this court, Admiral, from subordinates
who were in your offi ce as of this period immediately
preceding 7 December 1941, that all personnel were on
the alert for the receipt of some very important—or a very
important answer from the Japanese government. Do you have
any knowledge of this situation?
Noyes: From the time of the 27 of November, gradually getting
more acute, we were making every eff ort to obtain any
information possible. I couldn’t say that we expected any particular
message. . . .
163 Ibid., p. 894.
164 Ibid.
165Ibid., p. 853, Kramer testimony.
166Ibid., p. 899.
167Ibid., p. 895.