Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

534 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
“Were you acquainted with the contents of this [“war warning”]
dispatch on or before 7 December 1941?” he replied, “Th ese are
my initials on this draft; those are my initials.” 157
Q. Were you present at any conference or discussion regarding
this dispatch prior to its having been released?
Noyes: Admiral Turner showed me that dispatch before he
took it in for release. Th ese are his initials. (Indicating.) Th ese
are mine. (Indicating.) It was prepared by Op12, which was
War Plans. 158
Noyes couldn’t remember what had sparked the November 27
“war warning” that “Negotiations with Japan . . . have ceased.”
[I]t wasn’t based on any information that came through me.
Whatever the statement was, I assumed at the time it was correct.
I hadn’t any doubt it was correct. I will be glad to express
an opinion. It is purely my recollection—a general recollection;
it may not be correct. I think that at that time Nomura
and Kurusu stated that they were through. Th e United States
hadn’t accepted what they had proposed, and negotiations were
supposed to be over. Afterwards, they were reopened, like all
diplomatic situations; it was a case of bluff at the time—a diplomatic
bluff in regard to the ceasing of negotiations, but that
is purely my memory, and that wasn’t anything that I had any
offi cial knowledge of. 159
Th e judge advocate tried to determine if there was some special
reason for sending, on December 4, the dispatch directing
the Naval Station, Guam, to destroy all secret and confi dential
157 Ibid., p. 892.
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid.