Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24–October 19, 1944) 533
Turner said he believed that the December 7, 1:00 p.m., delivery
time indicated an attack by the Japanese against the United
States or Great Britain. “[O]n certainly the Kra Peninsula,” Turner
said, “a landing in Siam and attacks of one nature or another, air
probably, on the Philippines, because we had scouting planes out
there, and some form of attack in Hawaii.” Turner considered
that an air attack against the Hawaiian Islands “was one of the
possibilities,” even “a probability.”
Q. Were you surprised on the morning of the 7th when Japan
made an air attack on the Hawaiian Islands?
Turner: Not in the least. 155
At the time of the attack, Admiral Noyes had been serving
in Washington as director of naval communications. According
to him, “Th e handling of communication intelligence was a
joint aff air between Offi ce of Naval Communications and the
Offi ce of Naval Intelligence,” then headed by Wilkinson. Naval
Communications “was responsible for the mechanics of cryptoanalysis,
including interception which could be done by naval
means.” As intelligence was developed it “was turned over to the
Offi ce of Naval Intelligence to handle according to their usual
procedure.” However, Noyes pointed out, the intercepts were not
handled by the usual procedure as they were considered
most secret—a much higher degree of secrecy than the ordinary
designation, “Secret,” due to the fact that it is useless if any
inkling reaches the enemy of the fact that we are able in any
way to read his communications. 156
Noyes proved a reluctant witness. He avoided issues, or limited
his responses to the obvious or irrelevant. When asked,
155 Ibid., part 32, p. 616.
156 Ibid., part 33, p. 889.