Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

532 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
on Hull’s advice “over the inter-offi ce phone . . . that to all intents
and purposes the thing was all over as far as negotiations were
concerned.” 151
Turner wrote the November 27 “war warning,” discussed
it with Stark, and it went out with Turner’s recommendation.
Turner was asked: “Why was it [that] the Hawaiian Islands were
not included [in that message] as a possible objective for Japan?”
Turner: Th e objectives which were put in there were the strategic
objectives. We did not believe that Japan would launch an
amphibious attack against the Hawaiian Islands. 152
However, Turner had felt
an attack was coming, and I was not at all surprised at the air
attack. I knew our carriers were out, and with the warnings
which had been given, I felt we would give them a pretty bad
beating before they got home. . . . We had done what we could to
take precautions against the attack carrying through. Th e order
was issued to deploy the Fleet in a defensive deployment. 153
According to Turner, that order meant
To send scouting forces out of diff erent kinds, to deploy submarines
in threatened directions, to put the Fleet to sea and in
a covering position for the Hawaiian Islands and a supporting
position for Midway. 154
151Ibid., p. 878.
152Ibid., part 32, p. 616.
153Ibid. Included in the November 27, 1941 “war warning message” (#272337):
ibid., part 33, p. 1176; also part 14, p. 1406, was the directive “Execute an appropriate
defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in
WPL46.”
154Ibid., part 33, p. 879.