Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24–October 19, 1944) 531
a certain section of the Japanese hierarchy were very anxious to
keep the United States out of the war, that is, keep the United
States from assisting Great Britain, but many of the moves
that had been made against Japan during 1940 and ’41 were
made by the United States. 146
When the Japanese assets in the United States were frozen by
executive order in July 1941, Turner said he
had expressed the opinion previously, and I again expressed it,
that that would very defi nitely bring on war with Japan. Th ere
was no possibility of composing matters after that unless Japan
made a complete backdown, which it was very apparent she
was not going to do. 147
Turner had helped draft the Navy’s November 24 message
warning the fi eld commanders that “a surprise aggressive movement
[by the Japanese] in any direction including attack on
Philippines or Guam is a possibility.” 148 By that time, he “was
personally convinced that they were going to go into Siam and
also into the Malay Peninsula as the initial move and also attack
the Philippines.” 149
Turner recalled discussing with Stark the “substance” of the
U.S. note, the so-called “ultimatum” of November 26. According
to Turner, Stark said at the time that “there wasn’t any possibility
that Japan would accept it.” 150 Turner said, “Mr. Hull kept
Admiral Stark very well informed at all times. . . . Th eir relations,”
Turner testifi ed, “were very close and cordial.” So Stark’s
November 27 “war warning” message to Kimmel had been based,
146 Ibid., p. 604.
147 Ibid.
148Ibid., part 33, pp. 1173–74, CNO Stark November 24, 1941 dispatch to fi eld
commanders, #242005; also part 14, p. 1405.
149Ibid., part 33, p. 878.
150Ibid., pp. 877–78.