Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

530 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Leigh Noyes, both of whom had been stationed in Washington
before the attack.
Turner was asked what he knew about Stark’s knowledge of
the Japanese intercepts. He said he had “discussed” the supersecret
decrypted messages with Stark “frequently,” although they
hadn’t talked about the importance of transmitting their contents
to Kimmel. 143 As a matter of fact, Turner got the impression from
what Stark said that Hawaii had facilities for decoding these messages
and that “they were actually doing more of the decrypting
in Pearl Harbor than we were in Washington.” 144
According to Turner, a War Plan (Rainbow Th ree) was issued
in January 1941 that
envisaged a major attack, a major line of eff ort of Japan against
the Philippines and either Borneo or Malaya; ultimately both,
depending on the direction of the strength that they had available.
. . . [W]e considered that any attack of that nature would
almost surely be accompanied by an attack on the Hawaiian
Islands and the Fleet of one or more forms of attack—air, submarine,
Fleet, or a combination of any of those. 145
Turner testifi ed that he had anticipated a Japanese-United
States war even before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. He
realized that “British and United States relationships had become
very close.” Although he knew
nothing about what assurances were given by the president to
Great Britain . . . [he] was convinced then that if Japan attacked
Britain in the Far East that the United States would immediately
enter the war against Japan.
Turner believed
143 Ibid., p. 886.
144 Ibid., pp. 881–82.
145 Ibid., part 32, p. 605.