Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24–October 19, 1944) 529
Th e next morning at the Navy Department, Kramer said he
found the fi nal part of Japan’s reply as well as one or two other
messages. 139 He put part 14 plus the other 13 parts and other new
messages in a folder that he left in Stark’s offi ce at about 9:00
a.m. 140
When Kramer “returned to the Navy Department at approximately
1020, a message directing [the Japanese ambassadors] in
rather emphatic language that delivery [of the Japanese 14-part
reply] be made to the Secretary of State at 1300 (1:00 p.m.) had
been received.” Also received was “a series of other messages,”
addressed to the Japanese ambassadors. One directed
fi nal destruction of Japanese codes still on hand. . . . Th ere was
another message thanking the ambassador for his services,
another addressed to the embassy staff , and one or two others
of like nature. Th at material was delivered within ten to fi fteen
minutes to Admiral Stark’s offi ce. 141
Kramer delivered the new intercepts to the State Department,
where Hull, Stimson, and Knox were meeting. In giving them to
Hull’s secretary, Kramer emphasized the 1:00 p.m. delivery time
(7:30 a.m. in Hawaii), fearing that Knox, a civilian would miss its
signifi cance. 142
Admiral Turner (War Plans) Had
Anticipated the Attack; Admiral Noyes
(Communications) Equivocates
Th e NCI stopped in San Francisco on their return trip from
Hawaii to Washington, to question Director of War Plans Admiral
Richmond K. Turner and Director of Naval Communications
139 Ibid.
140Ibid., pp. 858–59.
141Ibid., p. 859.
142 Ibid.