Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

528 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Had Stark received the November 28 intercept stating that,
with the Japanese government’s reply “in two or three days” to
the State Department’s note of November 26, 132 “the negotiations
will be de facto ruptured”? Th is message “was delivered,” Kramer
said, “as all the negotiation messages were delivered, to the Chief
of Naval Operations.” Kramer was as certain as he could be that
“all these important messages were delivered to the Offi ce of the
Chief of Naval Operations.” 133
Among the most important messages Kramer handled was
this Japanese reply to our November 26 134 “humiliating,” according
to the Japanese, proposal. On December 6 we intercepted
the “Pilot Message” 135 announcing to the Japanese ambassadors
that Tokyo would soon be sending their government’s reply to
the United States November 26 proposal. Th is reply would be in
English and would be “very long,” fourteen parts. 136 In the middle
of the afternoon, Kramer became aware that this message was
coming in. 137 “[I]n guarded language” he explained to Admiral
Wilkinson the nature of the message. Th en he proceeded to the
White House. From there he went to Knox’s apartment and
Wilkinson’s home. Kramer was unable to reach Stark that evening,
although he believed Wilkinson was in touch with him or
his aides. 138
132Ibid., part 33, pp. 870, 1370; also part 12, p. 195. Japanese intercept #844,
November 28, 1941.
133Ibid., part 33, p. 870.
134Ibid., part 12, p. 195. Tokyo to Washington, #844, November 29, 1941.
135Ibid., part 33, p. 1380. Also part 12, pp. 238–39. Tokyo to Washington #901
(Pilot Message).
136Ibid., part 14, pp. 239–45. Tokyo to Washington #902, 14 part message,
December 6/7, 1941.
137Ibid., part 33, p. 857. It was in the Japanese code so it had to be decrypted,
but “[a]ll parts of the [14-part] message were in English, so that translation
was not required” (ibid., part 14, p. 1413).
138Ibid., part 33, p. 857.