Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24–October 19, 1944) 527
were doing a great deal for the British in their war and working
closely with them. In fact, it was almost a joint front as regards
negotiations with the Japs. Th at note that we had handed the
Japanese on 26 November had only been given to them after
consultation, with Japanese knowledge, with the Dutch and
Chinese as well as the British. Consequently . . . the Japs were
very concerned about what action we were taking, where our
Fleet might be, what action we might take in case the Japs did
make a move against the British. 129
Kramer testifi ed about relaying information to Stark and
occasionally even discussing it with him. “Th e majority of times,”
Kramer said, “the folder [of Japanese intercepts] was left with his
aide.” Just how much Stark read, Kramer didn’t know, but Kramer
said he
made a point of pointing out to his aide, his fl ag secretary, which
were the things of most immediate importance or interest to
the Admiral. Occasionally I would indicate that the Admiral
should see them at once, or as soon as possible. At other times
when a particular hot item . . . came in, I would request permission
to see the Admiral directly and would take it in. Th at
happened quite frequently during the fall of ‘41.
By “frequently,” Kramer meant, “two or three or four times a
week.” 130
When asked whether Stark had seen one of the intercepted
Tokyo-Honolulu ships-in-harbor messages, Kramer couldn’t be
“positive whether the Chief of Naval Operations actually saw
it, but . . . it would have been in a folder that was left in his
offi ce.” 131
129 Ibid., p. 867.
130 Ibid., p. 852.
131 Ibid., p. 856.