Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

526 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
testifi ed. 123 Kramer also remembered the “Winds Code Execute.”
He said he “was shown such a message by the GY watch offi cer,
recognized it as being of this nature, walked with him to Captain
Saff ord’s offi ce.” 124
When this “Winds Code Execute” came through on
December 3 or 4, “Captain Saff ord took the ball.” Kramer did
not handle its distribution himself “because of the fact that this
was a plain language message, and because of the fact that special
arrangements had been made to handle” it. 125 Kramer believed
Saff ord took the message directly to Admiral Noyes’ offi ce; he
knew that Admiral Noyes was highly interested in that particular
plain language code because of his previous instructions
to me [Kramer] to make out these cards so that he could leave
it with certain high offi cers and the Secretary, all with the view
of getting the word to those people promptly, whether it was
any time of the day or night. 126
Kramer recalled the Japanese language words, HIGASHI
NO KAZEAME. Th eir “literal meaning,” he said, “is East Wind,
Rain. Th at is plain Japanese language. Th e sense of that, however,
meant strained relations or a break in relations, possibly even
implying war with a nation to the eastward, the United States.” 127
It “could be inferred to imply as including an actual rupture of
relations, or possibly even war.” 128
Kramer continued:
[W]e knew they were planning something against Britain. . . .
We knew, too, that the Japs were very much aware of the fact we
123 Ibid., p. 871.
124 Ibid., p. 853.
125 Ibid., p. 853.
126 Ibid., p. 871.
127 Ibid., p. 853.
128 Ibid., p. 867.