Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24–October 19, 1944) 525
there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out
between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some
clash of arms and . . . the time of the breaking out of this war
may come quicker than anyone dreams. 118
Kramer said he
prepared a special paraphrased version of that for Mr. Roosevelt
which he retained; otherwise, neither the State Department
nor the White House were ever permitted . . . to retain any of
these dispatches. 119
Kramer remembered the “Winds Code” set-up clearly. “On
receipt of this particular message, on the instructions of the
Director of Naval Communications, Admiral Noyes,” Kramer
prepared some cards with “the expressions contained in this
exhibit, and the meaning:” 120 HIGASHI NO KAZEAME
(East wind rain, Japan-United States relations in danger);
KITANOKAZE KUMORI ( Japan-U.S.S.R. relations in danger);
NISHI NO KAZE HARE (West wind clear, Japan-British
relations in danger). 121 Noyes indicated that he intended to leave
these cards with certain senior offi cers of the Navy Department.
According to Kramer, Noyes “arranged with Captain Saff ord, the
head of Op-20-G, the section of Communications that handled
this material, to have any message in this phraseology handled
promptly by watch offi cers, not only in OP-20-G but through
the regular watch offi cers of the Communications section of the
Navy Department.” 122 “[A]ll that Op-20-G organization were
very much on the qui vive looking for that . . . warning,” Kramer
118 Ibid., p. 869. See also part 12, p. 204 ( Japanese intercept #985).
119 Ibid., part 33, p. 873.
120 Ibid., p. 853.
121 Ibid., p. 738, (Tokyo-Washington Circular #2353). See also part 12, p. 154.
122 Ibid., part 33, p. 853.