Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

520 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Marshall continued:
Th e information that we obtained from the Japanese actions
in China, and particularly as they approached Indo-China, as
well as from our most secret sources, pointed to an evident
intention to move into Th ailand. . . . It seemed to us that they
were defi nitely going to take some action to cut the Burma
Road, possibly closing the port of Rangoon. It seemed evident
to us that Malaysia—the Malay-Kra Peninsula—was very definitely
threatened. It was plainly evident to us that they were
accumulating supplies to go into Indo-China, and apparently
were going into Th ailand. We had no specifi c indications . . .
of their intentions regarding the Philippines other than those
which automatically suggested themselves to us geographically.
. . . [W]e had reports of movements of convoys down the coast
of Indo-China.
Marshall recalled “no indication of any Japanese plans in preparation
for an assault on Hawaii.” 101
With respect to the intercepts, Marshall did not recall the
Tokyo message setting November 29, 1941, as the deadline by
which the Japanese ambassadors should complete their negotiations
with the United States, although he was “reasonably certain”
that he had seen or been informed about it. 102 He had a “very
dim recollection” of the “Winds Code” setup intercept, but didn’t
recall any information about any part of the “Winds Code” having
been put into eff ect. 103
Marshall had “no defi nite recollection” of being on the alert,
expecting a Japanese reply to Hull’s November 26 note to the
Japanese. 104 Asked whether, on Saturday, December 6, he had been
“acquainted with the fact that Japan had sent to her ambassadors
101Ibid., p. 561.
102Ibid., part 33, p. 820.
103Ibid., pp. 821–22.
104Ibid., p. 821.