Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24–October 19, 1944) 519
throughout his testimony was that he believed he had conveyed
to Kimmel all the information he needed.
Army Chief of Staff General Marshall’s
Memory is Poor
General Marshall appeared before the NCI. Since “that tragedy
occurred,” he said, his whole attention had been “turned to
other things from that instant, and I didn’t see a record or look
at a thing until, as a matter of fact, the last day or two, trying to
get something for this board.” He had considered the pre-attack
events simply “water over the dam.” 98
Marshall testifi ed at length about the problems of supplying
men and materiel to the outlying military posts—Hawaii,
the Philippines, Panama, and the Pacifi c Islands—while at the
same time supporting Great Britain in the Atlantic and Africa,
and continuing the training of men here at home. 99 “[O]ur relations
with the Japanese appeared to degenerate progressively
throughout 1941,” he said. In February the Army and Navy
departments decided “to take all the women and children out of
the Philippines.” According to Marshall, “in July and August the
situation became conspicuously critical. Th at was the time of the
enforcement of the economic sanctions against Japan.” He had
“thought for some time that war was imminent.” He and Stark
were trying
to do all in our power here at home, with the State Department
or otherwise, to try to delay this break to the last moment,
because of our state of unpreparedness and because of our
involvement in other parts of the world. 100
98Ibid., part 32, p. 557.
99Ibid., pp. 554–59.
100Ibid., p. 560.