Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24–October 19, 1944) 517
and nothing happened on the 25th, it would have, in my opinion,
been bad ball. Again, if I had sent a date of the 29th . . . and
nothing had happened, again it would probably have weakened
the dispatch which we did send, and which, in my opinion,
covered the situation. Judging by what is now perhaps hindsight,
I am glad that I did not include the dates. 89
Stark’s memory appeared poor. He did not recall seeing the
document mentioning the “Winds Code.” According to him, the
setup intercept, translated November 28, “added nothing to what
I had already sent in the [war warning] dispatch of the 27th.” 90
He did not recall the Japanese ambassadors’ two-part dispatch of
November 26, summarizing for their government’s benefi t the
U.S. proposal of that day. 91 Nor did Stark remember seeing—in
the form in which it was presented to the NCI—the Tokyo message
of December 1 reporting that the “situation continues to
be increasingly critical” but that “to prevent the United States
from becoming unduly suspicious we [the Japanese government]
have been advising the press . . . the negotiations are continuing.”
It “may very well have been discussed at that time.” But in
any event, he said, it “added nothing . . . to what had been sent”
out formerly. 92 Stark did not remember “specifi cally” the Tokyo
requests for “reports relative to ships in Pearl Harbor.” Nor did he
recall Tokyo’s request about ships by specifi c areas there. When
asked if he remembered the message translated December 6, “relative
to the movements of American warships in Pearl Harbor,
the courses taken and speeds maintained,” he answered, “No, I
do not.”
89Ibid., part 33, pp. 788–89.
90Ibid., p. 789.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., p. 791.