Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24–October 19, 1944) 515
Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan. . . . [T]he time of the breaking
out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.”
Saff ord: Th at was not sent . . . neither to [Kimmel] nor [Hart
in Manila]. 85
Saff ord knew of one attempt to disseminate intercept information
to Kimmel and Bloch. Commander McCollum, chief of
the Far Eastern section of naval intelligence, “wrote up a long
message about 4 or 5 or 6 pages long, approximately 500 words,
giving a complete and brief and very forceful summary of developments
up to that time, up to 4 December, 1941.” On the afternoon
of December 4, Saff ord had been in the offi ce of Admiral
Leigh Noyes, director of naval communications, when Captain
Th eodore S. Wilkinson, director of the offi ce of naval intelligence,
came in with McCollum’s message for Kimmel and gave it to
Noyes to read. As Noyes fi nished a page, he handed it to Saff ord
to read. According to his testimony,
It was a very complete summary of what had happened. It
began with the withdrawal of Japanese merchant ships from the
Atlantic and Indian Oceans in July. It mentioned the evacuation
of Japanese Nationals from Malaya and the Netherlands East
Indies. It included the fact that diplomatic relations were at
an impasse; that neither party would yield, and it had a direct
reference to the winds message . . . and said that we considered
that this was . . . the signal of execute of the Japanese war plans;
that we expected that war was imminent.
According to Saff ord, McCollum had done a very thorough job.
When Noyes fi nished reading, Wilkinson asked what he thought
of it. Noyes responded, “I think it’s an insult to the intelligence of
the Commander-in-Chief.”
85 Ibid., p. 782. For Tokyo-Berlin message, see part 12, pp. 204–05.