Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24–October 19, 1944) 513
War Department. And, Saff ord said, this message was included
“in the routine distribution, which was made around noon each
day.” 76
Saff ord’s dogged search for the pre-attack intercepts located
most of them, including the November 19 “Winds Code” setup
message. 77 However, in spite of repeated searches since mid-
November 1943, he said he could fi nd no trace of its implementation.
78 Th us doubt was cast on whether the Japanese had
ever actually used a “Winds Code Execute” to communicate
with their overseas offi cials. “A great many messages and other
material were misplaced during frequent moves consequent to
the growth of the Naval Intelligence organization,” Saff ord said,
although he thought all the Japanese messages intercepted had
been located or accounted for except this “Winds Code Execute.”
Even the Army’s Signal Intelligence Service had failed to locate
a single copy. “[T]his Winds Message,” Saff ord said, “is very conspicuous
by its absence.” 79
He continued with his testimony about intercepts not given
to the court. On November 26, 1941, the United States had
rejected the Japanese proposal for a modus vivendi. Tension and
uncertainty prevailed among top Washington offi cials; the State
Department was on the qui vive. On November 28, when our
State Department offi cials read the intercept saying that Tokyo
would reply “in two or three days” to what they called our “humiliating
proposal,” the Department realized the Japanese government
was not going to agree to our terms. Japan’s ambassadors
were told by their government that “negotiations will be de facto
ruptured” but not to “give the impression that the negotiations
76Ibid., p. 773.
77Ibid., pp. 738, 1368 ( Japanese circular #2353); pp. 755, 1367 ( Japanese
circular #2354); also part 12, pp. 154–55.
78Ibid., part 33, p. 772.
79 Ibid., p. 782.