Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ... Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24–October 19, 1944) 511 to Honolulu dated November 15, asking them to “make your ‘ships in harbor report’ irregular, but at a rate of twice a week.” 68 On December 4, we learned that on November 20, Tokyo had told the consul general in Honolulu to “investigate comprehensively the fl eet _______[sic] bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation.” 69 Saff ord testifi ed: “On December 5 we learned that Tokyo had instructed [the consul] in Honolulu on November 29: ‘In the future, report even when there are no ship movements’.” 70 During the Hart inquiry, Saff ord had testifi ed about the “Winds Code,” but the Japanese intercepts had not then been available. Saff ord brought the subject up again. Th e Japanese message setting up the “Winds Code” had been sent from Tokyo, Saff ord said, on November 19. 71 It provided for inserting false weather reports, each containing a secret meaning, in the middle and at the end of daily Japanese language shortwave news broadcasts, permitting the Japanese government to reach her representatives around the world in the event it could no longer communicate in normal code. 72 Saff ord testifi ed that his fi rst indication the code setup had been implemented and that a “Winds Codes Execute” had actually been picked up came on December 4, around 8:00 a.m. He had not seen a copy of the translation since “about the 15th of December, 1941,” but to the best of his recollection, the translation had said, “War with America; war with England; and peace with Russia.” 73 Th is “Winds Code Execute,” the Navy Department communications intelligence unit had then 68Ibid., part 33, p. 777 ( Japanese intercept #111); also part 12, p. 262. 69Ibid., part 12, p. 263 ( Japanese intercept #111). 70Ibid., part 33, pp. 777, 1379 ( Japanese intercept #122); also part 12, p. 263. 71Ibid., part 33, pp. 738, 1368 ( Japanese circular #2353); also part 12, p. 154. 72Ibid., part 33, pp. 770–75, Saff ord testimony. 73 Ibid.
512 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy “regarded . . . as defi nitely committing the Japanese Government to war with the United States and Britain.” 74 Saff ord was asked: Captain, in a previous answer you stated that the copy of the intercept using the winds code which you saw on the morning of 4 December 1941 indicated a break in diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan and Japan and Great Britain, and war between these nations. Was there anything in the establishment of the code originally which would indicate . . . war as contrasted with a mere break in diplomatic relations?” Saff ord said, Th e Dutch translation said “war.” Th e Japanese language is very vague and you can put a number of constructions or interpretations or translations on the same message. In very important documents it was customary for the Army and Navy to make independent translations. . . . Th e general facts would be alike. However, the people in Communications Intelligence and the people in Signal Intelligence Service and the people in the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence, as well as the Director of Naval Intelligence, considered that meant war, that it was “a signal of execute for the Japanese war plans.” 75 Saff ord continued, “[I]mmediate distribution [of the “Winds Code Execute”] was made to the regular people before 9:00 a.m., that morning.” It went to the director of naval intelligence (Wilkinson), the director of war plans (Turner), the director of naval communications (Noyes), the assistant chief of naval operations (Ingersoll), and the chief of naval operations (Stark). Copies were also sent to the State Department, the White House, and the 74Ibid., part 26, pp. 390–94, especially p. 394, Saff ord testimony before the Hart Inquiry. 75Ibid., part 33, pp. 772–73.
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<strong>The</strong> Navy Court <strong>of</strong> Inquiry (July 24–October 19, 1944) 511<br />
to Honolulu dated November 15, asking them to “make your ‘ships<br />
in harbor report’ irregular, but at a rate <strong>of</strong> twice a week.” 68 On<br />
December 4, we learned that on November 20, Tokyo had told the<br />
consul general in Honolulu to “investigate comprehensively the<br />
fl eet _______[sic] bases in the neighborhood <strong>of</strong> the Hawaiian<br />
military reservation.” 69 Saff ord testifi ed: “On December 5 we<br />
learned that Tokyo had instructed [the consul] in Honolulu on<br />
November 29: ‘In the future, report even when there are no ship<br />
movements’.” 70<br />
During the Hart inquiry, Saff ord had testifi ed about the<br />
“Winds Code,” but the Japanese intercepts had not then been<br />
available. Saff ord brought the subject up again. Th e Japanese<br />
message setting up the “Winds Code” had been sent from Tokyo,<br />
Saff ord said, on November 19. 71 It provided for inserting false<br />
weather reports, each containing a secret meaning, in the middle<br />
<strong>and</strong> at the end <strong>of</strong> daily Japanese language shortwave news<br />
broadcasts, permitting the Japanese government to reach her<br />
representatives around the world in the event it could no longer<br />
communicate in normal code. 72 Saff ord testifi ed that his fi rst indication<br />
the code setup had been implemented <strong>and</strong> that a “Winds<br />
Codes Execute” had actually been picked up came on December<br />
4, around 8:00 a.m. He had not seen a copy <strong>of</strong> the translation since<br />
“about the 15th <strong>of</strong> December, 1941,” but to the best <strong>of</strong> his recollection,<br />
the translation had said, “War with America; war with<br />
Engl<strong>and</strong>; <strong>and</strong> peace with Russia.” 73 Th is “Winds Code Execute,”<br />
the Navy Department communications intelligence unit had then<br />
68Ibid., part 33, p. 777 ( Japanese intercept #111); also part 12, p. 262.<br />
69Ibid., part 12, p. 263 ( Japanese intercept #111).<br />
70Ibid., part 33, pp. 777, 1379 ( Japanese intercept #122); also part 12, p. 263.<br />
71Ibid., part 33, pp. 738, 1368 ( Japanese circular #2353); also part 12, p. 154.<br />
72Ibid., part 33, pp. 770–75, Saff ord testimony.<br />
73 Ibid.