Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

510 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Also on December 1, we read a long intercepted message
from the Japanese ambassador in Berlin to Tokyo reporting that
German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop had said, “Should Japan
become engaged in a war against the United States, Germany, of
course, would join the war immediately.” 64
Tokyo also advised its Washington ambassadors on December
1 that London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila had been
“instructed to abandon the use of code machines and to dispose
of them.” 65 Tokyo advised Hsinking (Changchun, Manchuria) on
December 1,
in view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause
Manchuria to participate in the war in which event Manchuria
will take the same steps toward England and America that this
country will take in case war breaks out. 66
On December 2, we translated and read a November 28 dispatch
to Tokyo from Hsinking:
[I]n the event that war breaks out with England and the United
States . . . [p]ersons to be interned: a. British nationals—339. b
American citizens—81 . . . d. Nationals of the Soviet or other
third powers observed to be obnoxious characters with pro-
British and American leanings are to be suitably taken care
of. 67
We had intercepted several messages to and from Tokyo and
the Japanese consul in Honolulu concerning surveillance of the
ships at Pearl Harbor. On December 3 we read a Tokyo message
64Ibid., part 33, p. 776 (Berlin to Tokyo #1393, November 29, 1941); also part
12, pp. 200–02.
65Ibid., part 33, p. 776–77 ( Japanese circular #2444, December 1, 1941); also
part 12, p. 209.
66Ibid., part 33, pp. 755–56 ( Japanese intercept #893); also part 12, pp.
09–10).
67Ibid., part 33, p. 776 ( Japanese intercept #781); also part 12, p. 198.