Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24–October 19, 1944) 509
November 5 the Japanese set a November 25 deadline for the
signing of the agreement the United States and Japanese ambassadors
were working on. 59 On November 14 the Japanese advised
their Washington ambassador, “Should negotiations collapse
. . . we will completely destroy British and American power in
China.” 60
On November 16, Tokyo wired that “Th e fate of our empire
hangs by the slender thread of a few days.” 61 On November
22 Tokyo postponed the deadline to November 29, advising
Nomura,
Th ere are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted
to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within
the next three or four days you can fi nish your conversations
with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the
29th . . . and in short if everything can be fi nished, we have
decided to wait until that date. 62
Saff ord testifi ed about other Japanese intercepts that gave
still further indications of impending war. On December 1 we
translated and read a November 30 dispatch from Tokyo to the
Japanese ambassador in Berlin advising him:
Th e conversations . . . between Tokyo and Washington . . . now
stand ruptured. . . . [T]here is extreme danger that war may
suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and
Japan through some clash of arms, and . . . this war may come
quicker than anyone dreams. 63
59Ibid, part 12, p. 100 ( Japanese intercept #736, November 5); also part 33, p.
1365.
60Ibid., part 33, p. 776 ( Japanese Circular 2319); also part 12, pp. 126–27.
61Ibid., part 33, p. 775, 1366; also part 12, pp. 137–38.
62Ibid., part 33, p. 1366 ( Japanese intercept #812); also part 12, p. 165.
63Ibid., part 33, p. 776 ( Japanese intercept #985); also part 12, p. 204.