Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Navy Court of Inquiry (July 24–October 19, 1944) 507
that part of the record which would in any way identify material
now held so secret that it has been denied this court be
taken out of the record and placed in a top secret status which
will absolutely preclude any leak and reference thereto.
Judge Advocate Biesemeier concurred. As a result, substantial
blocks of NCI testimony referring to secret intelligence were
“deleted from the record and fi led in a secure place with due
reference to them so that they may be seen by proper authorities
on demand.” 51
Schuirmann was called back again to testify. Now that the
MAGIC intercepts had been introduced, he was somewhat more,
although not much more, responsive. 52 He did not remember some
documents. His recollection of the message setting up the Winds
Code was “quite hazy” or “extremely hazy.” 53 When asked about
the December 6 13-part Japanese reply to our November 26 proposal,
he asserted without hesitation that he “was not acquainted
with the contents on the 6th of December, 1941.” 54
Schuirmann did admit discussing some of the November 26
to December 7 messages with Admiral Stark.
Schuirmann: Yes, sir. I did discuss the situation but when it
came down to pointing out certain messages, you ask if I made
a particular point of discussing that particular message with the
Admiral and I just don’t remember. 55
Th ere was a “general feeling,” Schuirmann said,
51Ibid., pp. 249–50. When the hearings were published after the war, these
special sections were printed out of context in a later part of the hearings,
forcing the reader to shuffl e pages continually back and forth to follow a
witness’s testimony.
52Ibid., p. 159.
53Ibid., part 33, pp. 738, 755.
54 Ibid., p. 749.
55 Ibid., p. 758.