Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

30 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Churchill’s May 15 letter pleaded to the United States for
help:
I trust you realise, Mr. President that the voice and force of the
United States may count for nothing if they are withheld too
long. . . . All I ask now is that you should proclaim nonbelligerency,
which would mean that you would help us with everything
short of actually engaging armed forces.
Churchill listed Britain’s “immediate needs”:
[F]irst of all, the loan of forty or fi fty of your older destroyers.
. . . Secondly, we want several hundred of the latest types of aircraft.
. . . Th irdly, anti-aircraft equipment and ammunition. . . .
Fourthly . . . to purchase steel in the United States.
Churchill continued: “We shall go on paying dollars for as
long as we can, but I should like to feel reasonably sure that
when we can pay no more, you will give us the stuff all the same.”
Churchill’s fi fth “need” was to have a U.S. squadron visit Irish
ports, where there had been reports of Germans dropped by
parachutes.
Th en Churchill added: “Sixthly, I am looking to you to
keep that Japanese dog quiet in the Pacifi c, using Singapore [in
Southeast Asia] in any way convenient.” 3
Roosevelt assured Churchill the next day that he was “most
happy to continue our private correspondence. . . . I am, of course,
giving every possible consideration to the suggestions made in
your message.” Th en he took Churchill’s several requests up one
by one.
With respect to the destroyers, FDR was “not certain that it
would be wise for that suggestion to be made to the Congress at
this moment.” As for the aircraft, he wrote “[w]e are now doing
everything within our power to make it possible for the Allied
3 Loewenheim, et al., eds., Roosevelt and Churchill, pp. 94–95.